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 Abstract 
 Legal mobilization in the courts has emerged as an increasingly important social 
movement strategy, which complements other political strategies. This paper 
explores legal and institutional factors that can account for the varying levels of 
legal mobilization in countries with a civil law system. It examines the diff erent 
legal opportunity structures (LOS) (such as judicial access and material and pro-
cedural law) and the extent to which strategic litigation has been employed by 
trade unions and other social actors to promote equal pay in four European countries: 
Switzerland, Germany, France, and Poland. While every component of LOS infl u-
ences legal mobilization, legal factors and legal context alone are not suffi  cient to 
explain the observed variations. Rather, they constitute an important general 
framework in which other social and political factors, such as norms about gender 
roles, equality, and litigation, are also signifi cant. Two issues seem to be especially 
relevant and have emerged as a rewarding fi eld of analysis—the role of media cov-
erage and organizational action frames. 
 Keywords :  equal pay ,  France ,  Germany ,  legal mobilization ,  legal opportunity 
structures ,  Poland ,  Switzerland 
 Résumé 
 La mobilisation juridique dans les tribunaux est devenue une stratégie de mouvement 
social de plus en plus importante, qui complète d’autres stratégies politiques. Le 
présent article explore les facteurs juridiques et institutionnels qui peuvent entrer en 
compte pour les divers niveaux de mobilisation juridique dans des pays possédant 
un système de droit civil. Il examine les diff érentes structures des opportunités 
juridiques (SOJ) (comme le recours judiciaire et la procédure et le droit en la matière) 
et la mesure dans laquelle des procédures judiciaires stratégiques ont été employées 
par des syndicats et d’autres acteurs sociaux afi n de promouvoir une égalité des 
salaires dans quatre pays européens : la Suisse, l’Allemagne, la France, et la Pologne. 
Même si chaque élément des SOJ infl uence la mobilisation juridique, les facteurs 
d’ordre juridique et le contexte juridique ne peuvent à eux seuls expliquer les varia-
tions observées. Ils sont plutôt un cadre général important dans lequel d’autres 
facteurs sociaux et politiques, comme les normes à propos des rôles sexuels, de l’égalité, 
 *  Th e author gratefully acknowledges research support from the Swiss National Science Foundation 
(grant no. 101 512-118 224). 
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cls.2013.21
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 14:42:01, subject to the Cambridge Core
 190   Gesine Fuchs
et des procédures judiciaires, sont eux aussi importants. Deux points semblent par-
ticulièrement pertinents et se révèlent être un domaine d’analyse enrichissant—le 
rôle de la couverture médiatique et les cadres d’action organisationnels. 
 Mots clés :  égalité des salaires ,  France ,  Allemagne ,  mobilisation juridique ,  structures 
des opportunités juridiques ,  Pologne ,  Suisse 
 Legal mobilization has evolved as an increasingly important strategy of social 
movements to advance their causes and to legitimize their goals.  1  A central form 
of legal mobilization is litigation in court, most oft en pursued with the strategic 
goal of eliciting a favorable judgment to support demands and arguments for legal 
change. Social movement organizations or groups launch or support test cases in 
court in order to promote legal and social change, endeavoring to change law and 
policies, to ensure that laws are properly interpreted and enforced, or to identify 
gaps in the existing law. Rulings can also directly alter practices, or they can be 
used to press for policy changes. Goals of strategic legal support also include raising 
public awareness or setting political agendas. Research to date has focused mainly 
on cases in common law countries where the courts are requested to fi nd solutions 
based on precedent. Here, courts have thousands of well-documented cases every 
year. However, we have little data regarding legal mobilization in civil law countries, 
where courts attach much more importance to legislation than to case law. Th us, 
strategic litigation becomes a less obvious option for exercising political pressure. 
Diff erences in the use of strategic litigation between legal systems, i.e., between com-
mon and civil law countries, seem quite understandable. But how we can explain 
the great diff erences in using the courts in similar cases in civil law countries? 
 This paper explores legal and institutional factors that may account for the 
varying levels of legal mobilization used by social movements in diff erent countries. 
Analyzing these factors will be a necessary condition to understand diff ering levels 
of legal mobilization. Th e article examines the diff erent legal opportunity struc-
tures and the extent to which strategic litigation has been employed by trade 
unions and other social actors to promote equal pay in four European civil law 
countries: Switzerland, Germany, France, and Poland. Since equality in the work-
place is regulated not only by law but also by governance structures between 
labor, employers, and sometimes the state, an analysis of legal factors is not fully 
suffi  cient to understand the diff ering litigation levels. I will argue for such relevant 
additional elements in the discussion and conclusion. 
 Th e paper uses principally data derived from cases between 1996  2  and 2006,  3  
although it also refers to more current developments. Th e data derives from national 
judicial databases, namely court rulings and case notes. Th is is supplemented with 
analysis of court reports published in two national, high-quality newspapers per 
country. Finally, data has been collated from interviews with approximately sixty 
 1  Michael W.  McCann , ed.,  Law and Social Movements ( Aldershot :  Ashgate ,  2006 ). 
 2  The year with the first equal pay court judgment in France (Cass. soc., 29 octobre 1996, 
n° 92-43.680). 
 3  Th e year the German Law on Equal Treatment came into force. 
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experts from universities, trade unions, and NGOs, and claimants as well as the 
lawyers who litigated equal pay cases.  4  
 Th e issue of equal pay is well suited for a comparative study on legal mobili-
zation for a number of reasons: Gender equality is a core value of modernity, and 
democracy and is now comprehensively codifi ed throughout Europe. European 
Union policy on gender equality and anti-discrimination is one of its most advanced 
policies, and the directives which govern this  5  create a comparably uniform legal 
background in the member states (and indirectly, also in Switzerland, which is not 
a member of the EU). Nevertheless, the gender wage gap in the member states 
remains as high as 25 percent  6  . A political commitment to gender equality would be 
credible if applied also to this redistribution issue. In addition, the gender pay gap 
is currently a prominent issue in European society. According to a Eurobarometer 
survey, it is also among the three top priority areas for action against gender 
inequality in the EU member states under focus in this paper.  7  
 Th ere are other ways to successfully combat the gender wage gap in addition 
to legislation and strategic litigation, for instance, collective bargaining and anti-
discrimination authorities.  8  Th erefore, one must ask, under what circumstances 
do social actors turn to litigation? Many studies on legal mobilization use a political 
process model to answer this question.  9  Following paradigms of social movement 
research, they look at resource mobilization and at legal and political opportunities. 
Social-constructivist analysis in the study of social movements, on the other hand, 
has pointed to the relevance of shared beliefs and cognitive frames both in society 
and in movements for mobilization.  10  If and how actors mobilize for the political 
objective of equal pay is thus not only a question of the legal situation, but also of 
the signifi cance and meaning society attributes to the value of gender equality. Th is 
article focuses on the concept of legal opportunity structures (LOS).  11  In particular, 
it explores the hypothesis that legal mobilization is more likely to happen when LOS 
are strong and conducive to strategies of legal mobilization. 
 4  Th ese persons were found via a web or newspaper search or by recommendation of interviewees. 
 5  See the discussion of these directives in the introduction to this special issue. 
 6  Eurostat,  Europe in fi gures. Eurostat yearbook 2010 (Luxembourg, 2010), 307. 
 7  Calculated from Eurobarometer 72.2 (2009); the statement that the European Union should deal 
“very” or “fairly” urgently with the problem of the pay gap was affi  rmed by 85 percent of the 
respondents in Germany, 89 percent in France and 75 percent in Poland. 
 8  Gesine Fuchs, “Promising paths to pay equity: A comparison of the potentials of strategic litigation, 
collective bargaining and anti-discrimination authorities in Switzerland, Germany and France,” 
 http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1664468. 
 9  E.g.,  Michael W.  McCann ,  Rights at work: Pay equity and the politics of legal mobilization ( Chicago : 
 University of Chicago Press ,  1994 ) ;  Lisa  Vanhala ,  Making Rights a Reality? Disability Rights Activists 
and Legal Mobilization ( Cambridge University Press ,  2010 ) ;  Ellen A.  Andersen ,  Out of the closets 
and into the courts: Legal opportunity structure and gay rights litigation ( Ann Arbor :  University of 
Michigan Press ,  2006 ). 
 10  For an overview, see  David A.  Snow , “ Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields , ” in 
 Th e Blackwell Companion to Social Movements , eds.  David A.  Snow ,  Sarah A.  Soule , and  Hanspeter 
 Kriesi ( Malden; Oxford; Carlton :  Blackwell ,  2004 ),  380 – 412 . 
 11  Cf.  Andersen ;  Chris  Hilson , “ New social movements: the role of legal opportunity , ”  Journal of 
European Public Policy , no. 2 ( 2002 ):  238 –55 ;  Lisa  Vanhala , “ Fighting discrimination through litiga-
tion in the UK: the social model of disability and the EU anti‐discrimination directive , ”  Disability & 
Society  21 , no.  5 ( 2006 ):  551 –65 ;  Rhonda  Evans Case and  Terri E.  Givens , “ Re-engineering Legal 
Opportunity Structures in the European Union? Th e Starting Line Group and the Politics of the 
Racial Equality Directive , ”  Journal of Common Market Studies  48 , no.  2 ( 2010 ):  221 –41. 
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 Th e fi rst section of the article discusses the concept of legal opportunity struc-
tures and explains the selection of countries. Th e article then describes the actual 
legal opportunity structures in the above-mentioned countries and in the European 
Union more generally. Quantitative and qualitative data on actual strategic litiga-
tion for equal pay will be presented in the third section, and the paper proceeds to 
discuss in which respect LOS can explain the diff erent patterns observed between 
the countries. Th e paper suggests in which respects the LOS should be diff erentiated 
and complemented with other explanations such as norms, gender roles, and social 
movement action frames as well as the role of mass media. Th e concluding section 
then proposes further avenues for research. 
 1.  Th e Concept of Legal Opportunity Structures 
 Th e political opportunity structure paradigm in social movement research states 
that political opportunities shaped by access to the political system or alliance and 
confl ict structures infl uence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social 
movements on their environment.  12  Drawing from this paradigm, and by analogy 
to political opportunity structures, socio-legal scholars have developed the con-
cept of  legal opportunity structures (LOS), which are mainly defi ned in relation to 
the judicial arena.  13  Th e existing literature stresses two sets of factors that variably 
combine to determine LOS: legal access, and substantive and procedural law. 
 Access to the court is the precondition for litigation. Who is eligible to sue? 
Do organizations have access to the courts (“associational standing”)?  14  Strategic 
litigation is more likely when legal rules allow for, or facilitate, group action. In the 
field of gender equality, most processes supported or initiated by social move-
ments or trade unions are brought forward by individuals or on their behalf. 
Another important factor shaping legal access is also linked to the availability 
of resources, which influences who can afford to go to court. In this regard, the 
existence of state legal aid, or the provision of aid and legal representation through 
membership organizations like trade unions, also crucially determines legal access. 
 As far as procedural law is concerned, legal mobilization is more likely to occur 
alongside procedural benefi ts in favor of the plaintiff , such as a reduced burden of 
proof or the court’s obligation to investigate on its own initiative. Legal mobilization 
can be helped also by having an independent institution in the background that can 
launch investigations on its own (like the French  Haute Autorité de la Lutte contre 
les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité (HALDE)) or initiate legal action itself (such as 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in the United States 
or the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC)). Logically, the stronger the 
position of individual or organizational claimants, the lower the expected fi nancial, 
 12  Herbert  Kitschelt , “ Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements 
in Four Democracies ,”  British Journal of Political Science ( 1986 ):  57 – 85 , 58. Overview in  Hanspeter 
 Kriesi , “ Political Context and Opportunity ,” in  Snow  et al ,  Th e Blackwell Companion to Social 
Movements ,  67 – 90 . 
 13  Although Andersen included alliance-confl ict systems in the political arena in her concept. 
 14  Evans  Case and Givens;  Karen J.  Alter and  Jeannette  Vargas , “ Explaining variation in the use 
of European litigation strategies—European community law and British gender equality policy , ” 
 Comparative Political Studies  32 , no.  4 ( 2000 ):  452 –84. 
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political, or emotional costs of a claim, and the higher the expected respective gains. 
Material provisions and justiciable rights provide the grounds for a claim and can 
render it more or less legitimate. A conducive opportunity structure would explic-
itly cite equal pay in the law, have a specifi c defi nition of what constitutes equal 
pay, as well as a clear defi nition of the judicial procedures available. If plaintiff s can 
refer to explicit and specifi c laws and regulations, their claims are legitimate. As it 
is rightly stated, “Constitutionally entrenched rights are particularly powerful 
because they enable interests to reframe their political demands as rights-based 
legal claims that may be used in the courts to trump policy decisions taken in the 
democratic decision-making arenas.”  15  
 For this research project, two countries with strong LOS “on the books,” 
Switzerland and France, and two countries with weak LOS, Germany and Poland, 
were selected. Switzerland, a non-member of the EU, is nevertheless surrounded by 
EU member states, and it selectively participates in Europeanization. It transposes 
European law autonomously where it is appropriate and politically feasible.  16  Poland 
was selected as a country with a state socialist past and a generally weak tradition 
of legal rights.  17  A description of the country-specifi c legal opportunity structures 
is provided in greater detail below in order to explain their categorization as having 
either strong or weak LOS. 
 In civil law countries, the relationship between court judgments and sustained 
changes in legal practice and jurisdiction differs from that within the common 
law tradition, as in the civil law there is no system of binding precedent. The 
primary sources of civil law are comprehensive codes and written laws, codifi ed 
and amended by the respective legislatures. In their decisions, judges are bound 
only to the law and the Constitution.  18  Th is would suggest that legislative politics 
are more important than judicial decisions for realizing political objectives. However, 
when a law comes into force, courts have to clarify and interpret it, sometimes 
in the light of paramount legislation like European Union directives or human 
rights conventions. In fact a ruling by a higher court, or several rulings in similar 
cases, may develop a persuasive authority. Th is may open up or close down oppor-
tunities to engage in legal action. Strategic litigation may be part of the interplay 
between case law emanating from different levels of the judiciary, academic 
interpretation, and legislation. This interplay results in a “prevailing opinion” 
(“herrschende Meinung”) that becomes hegemonic in the legal and academic 
community.  19  Thus, case law in the civil law tradition has effects that are more 
indirect. 
 15  Evans Case and Givens, “Re-engineering Legal Opportunity Structures.” 
 16  Cf.  Sandra Lavenex , “ Switzerland’s Flexible Integration in the EU: A Conceptual Framework , ”  Swiss 
Political Science Review  15 , no.  4 ( 2009 ):  547 –75 ;  Pascal  Sciarini ,  Alex  Fischer , and  Sarah  Nicolet , 
“ How Europe Hits Home: evidence from the Swiss case , ”  Journal of European Public Policy , no. 3 
( 2004 ):  353 –78. 
 17  Gesine  Fuchs , “ Using Strategic Litigation for Women’s Rights: Political Restrictions in Poland and 
Achievements of the Women’s Movement , ”  European Journal of Women’s Studies , 20(1), 21–43. 
 18  See for example the German Basic Law, Art. 97, 1: “Judges shall be independent and subject only 
to the law.” 
 19  Uwe  Wesel , “hM, ” in  Aufk lärungen über Recht: Zehn Beiträge zur Entmythologisierung , ( Frankfurt a.M : 
 suhrkamp ,  1981 ),  14 – 40 . 
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 2.  LOS in the European Union and the four Countries under 
investigation 
 National and European laws serve as a framework for actual litigation. EU law 
has been instrumental in achieving progress on gender equality issues in the 
workplace across the member states. In primary law, the Treaty of Rome (1957) 
first introduced the equal pay principle in Article 119 (now Article 157 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU) in order to prevent 
unfair competition.  20  Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union states that the 
promotion of equality between men and women is a task for all member states. 
Article 8 of TFEU lays down the gender mainstreaming principle, stating: “In 
all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote 
equality, between men and women.” Since 1976, the European Union has issued 
over a dozen directives (secondary laws), which the member states had to trans-
pose into national law. 
 Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal oppor-
tunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation is a recast of several directives relevant in the context of equal pay. 
Article 4 of this directive introduces the principles of equal pay for equal work 
or for work of equal value. Article 2 prohibits harassment, less favorable treatment 
related to pregnancy or maternity leave, as well as direct and indirect discrimination. 
Indirect discrimination is defi ned as “an apparently neutral provision, criterion 
or practice that would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage com-
pared with persons of the other sex.” Article 3 allows for positive action in order to 
ensure “full equality in practice between men and women in working life.” Member 
states shall ensure judicial procedures for the enforcement of the directive’s obliga-
tions, and they shall ensure some form of associational standing on behalf or in 
support of complainants (cf. Article 17(2)). Th e directive provides for eff ective and 
dissuasive penalties for discrimination, and compensation must not have a legally 
defi ned limit (Article 18). Article 19 deals with the burden of proof in discrimination 
cases: complainants only have to establish facts from which it may be presumed 
that there has been discrimination. It shall then be for the defendant to prove that 
there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment. Finally, Article 20 
stipulates the establishment of equality bodies for the “promotion, analysis, moni-
toring and support of equal treatment.” 
 Sustained legal action before the Court of Justice of the EU by lawyers, indi-
viduals, and trade unions has substantially contributed to the development of 
anti-discrimination law.  21  Hence the case law of the Court of Justice has great 
importance for national laws on gender equality, and in this regard, under the 
preliminary reference procedure, the Court of Justice has the final authority in 
 20  Petra  Schott , “ Th e European Union: A Trailblazer for Equality ,” in  Between success and disappointment. 
Gender equality policies in an enlarged Europe , eds.  Susanne  Baer and  Miriam  Hoheisel , Gender 
kompetent 4 ( Bielefeld :  Kleine ,  2008 ),  27 – 45 . 
 21  Alter and Vargas, “Explaining variation in the use of European litigation strategies”;  Rachel A. 
 Cichowski , “ Women’s Rights, the European court and supranational constitutionalism ,”  Law & 
Society Review ( 2004 ):  489 – 512 ;  Rachel A.  Cichowski ,  Th e European court, civil society and 
European integration ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press ,  2007 ). 
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the interpretation of EU law. As of 2008, the Court had issued about two hundred 
judgments related to equality.  22  Th e CJ’s decisions serve as an “interpretative guide-
line” for the national court to fi nd a specifi c solution.  23  Several provisions in the 
directive 2006/54/EC (e.g., reversing the burden of proof in gender equality claims 
to fall on the employer rather than the victim), show that the European Union has 
provided an excellent legal opportunity structure for gender equality claims and 
that its law also substantially informs LOS in the member states. 
 Th e paper will now evaluate the LOS in the selected countries, starting with 
the two examples of weak structures, Germany and Poland, followed by the two 
examples of strong structures, France and Switzerland. In Germany, although 
equal rights between men and women and respective state action are laid down 
in Article 3(2) of the German Basic Law, the LOS in Germany have been weak in 
the past and continue to be so, despite the adoption of the General Act on Equal 
Treatment in 2006. Initially, anti-discrimination clauses were introduced into 
the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) in 1980. However, the Federal Republic 
of Germany at the time did not recognize the then-European Community law as 
the supreme legal system; therefore, the provisions introduced were nominal and, 
as soon became obvious, inadequate to prevent discrimination at the workplace. 
Sexual discrimination in hiring, promotion, instructions, and dismissal was pro-
hibited (BGB §611a Abs. 1). Compensation for discrimination in refusing to hire 
someone went up from application expenses (until 1994), to a maximum of three 
months salary (until 1998), and aft erwards had no legal limit (BGB §611a, Abs. 2). 
Equal pay for equal work or work of equal value was explicitly mentioned in BGB 
§612 Abs. 3. A separate act has banned discrimination against part-time and fi xed-
term employees since 2000.  24  In 1998, the reduced burden of proof on victims 
of sex discrimination was introduced in BGB §611a. However, no associational 
standing existed. 
 In 2006, the General Act on Equal Treatment (Allgemeines Gleichbehand-
lungsgesetz (AGG)) was passed after lengthy discussions, mainly in order to 
implement directives on other grounds of discrimination and in the domain of 
goods and services.  25  Th e AGG forbids discrimination on the relevant grounds 
and in diff erent areas, but it abandons the former explicit clauses on equal pay in 
the Civil Code. Organizations may now act as “legal advisors” in an individual’s 
court hearings (Art. 23, 2 AGG), but this provision is far from ensuring strong 
associational standing. Th e AGG also set up a Federal Anti-discrimination Agency, 
 22  Cf. Art. 267 TFEU,  Alec  Stone Sweet , “ Th e European Court of Justice and the judicialization of EU 
governance ,”  Living Reviews in European Governance , no. 2 ( 2010 ):  1 – 50 . 
 23  Schott, “Th e European Union: A Trailblazer for Equality,” 39. 
 24  Dagmar  Schiek , “ Torn between Arithmetic and Substantive Equality? Perspectives on Equality in 
German Labour Law ,”  The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations , no. 2 ( 2002 ):  149 –67, 159f. 
 25  2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial 
or ethnic origin, 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employ-
ment and occupation, 2002/73/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women 
in the access to and supply of goods and services. 
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which may advise on judicial possibilities and engage in counseling, research, and 
awareness raising. It cannot support aggrieved persons, investigate cases, or act as 
a party in court (§§25-30 AGG). 
 Concerning components of legal access other than associational standing, 
Germany has means-tested state legal aid, and trade union members enjoy free 
legal counseling and representation. In court, claimants have to produce all the 
evidence. No specifi c procedures exist for discrimination cases; in labor law cases, 
the court will have an obligatory reconciliation hearing (Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz § 54). 
In short, in Germany legal opportunity structures are weak because the German 
legal system does not provide for associational standing, it has a weak equality 
body, and equal pay for work of equal value is no longer explicitly mentioned 
in the AGG. While, as a result of CJ rulings, stronger provisions were introduced 
into German law between 1980 and 2006, and in the 1980s and 1990s several 
strategic individual cases, mainly dealing with indirect discrimination, were sup-
ported by trade unions,  26  unfortunately, equal pay litigation was not pursued 
and German provisions in this area remain weak today.  27  
 Legal opportunity structures in Poland are also rather weak. As in all post-
communist countries, equal rights between men and women had been laid down in 
constitutions aft er 1945. However, the equal rights provision that is now Article 33 
of the Polish Constitution of 1997 includes no obligation for the state to take 
action to promote gender equality. During EU accession negotiations, the adoption 
of the so-called gender acquis was delayed by heated and polemic debates until 
autumn 2001,  28  and the European Commission did not push very hard for 
adoption.  29  Later, Directive 2006/54/EC was incorporated directly into Polish 
law. Thus, the adoption of formal gender equality ultimately transpired much 
faster in Poland than it did in the older EU member states, and the fi nal outcome 
was also more homogeneous.  30  The Labor Code took over the literal wording 
of EU prohibitions, definitions and measures (see Art. 9, Art. 11 and Art. 18). 
 It was not until the end of 2010 that an equal treatment law was adopted.   31  Th e 
Polish Human Rights Defender Ombudsperson was declared responsible for con-
ducting surveys, analyzing, monitoring and supporting equal treatment of all 
 26  As well as some counter mobilization against positive measures: C-450/93, 17.10.1995, Rec. 1995, 
P. I-3051, C-409/95, 11.11.1997, Rec. 1997, p. I-6363 and Badeck, C-158/97, 28.3.2000, Rec. 2000, 
p. I-1875; cf.  Petra  Kodré and  Henrike  Müller , “ Shift ing Policy Frames: EU Equal Treatment 
Norms and Domestic Discourses in Germany , ” in  Gendering Europeanisation , ed.  Ulrike  Liebert 
( Bruxelles usw :  Peter Lang ,  2003 ),  83 – 116 . 
 27  There is only anecdotal evidence that this strategic litigation was brought forward mainly by 
lawyers with a good nose for suitable cases. No systematic research exists to date on why liti-
gation featuring indirect discrimination was pursued in Germany in this period. See interviews 
D1, D4, and D6. 
 28  Cf.  Leah Seppanen Anderson , “ European Union Gender Regulations in the East: Th e Czech and 
Polish Accession Process , ”  East European Politics and Societies , no. 1 ( 2006 ):  101 – 125 . 
 29  Cf.  Charlotte Bretherton , “ Gender mainstreaming and EU enlargement: swimming against the 
tide? ”  Journal of European Public Policy , no. 1 ( 2001 ):  60 – 81 . 
 30  Cf.  Frank Schimmelfennig and  Uwe  Sedelmeier , eds.,  Th e Europeanization of Central and Eastern 
Europe ( Ithaca :  Cornell University Press ,  2005 ). 
 31  Dz. U. Nr. 254 poz. 1700 (Ustawa z dnia 3 grudnia 2010r. o wdro ż eniu niektórych przepisów Unii 
Europejskiej w zakresie równego traktowania. (Law of 3rd December 2010 on the transposition of 
several regulations of the European Union concerning equal treatment). 
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people, publishing reports, and making recommendations on any discrimina-
tion issue. Contrary to these new assignments, the budget was significantly 
reduced in 2011 (by around 400.000 euros).  32  Furthermore, the Plenipotentiary for 
Equal Treatment is responsible for all information and awareness raising issues. 
Various governmental bodies for equality had existed since the early 1990s, which, 
however, were characterized by institutional instability due to political changes 
in government.  33  
 In 2004, organizations obtained legal standing on behalf of aggrieved per-
sons and may now join proceedings at any stage (Code of Civil Procedure, 
Kodeks Post ę powania Cywilnego, Art. 61–63 and 462). However, unlike in the 
other countries analyzed here, state legal aid in Poland operates without a compre-
hensive legal basis and is materially insufficient. Trade unions give legal advice 
to their members, but they cannot afford to represent all of them in court.  34  
Legally weak institutions charged with enforcing the anti-discrimination pro-
visions, insuffi  cient aid and support, as well as the obstacles to accessing justice, 
give rise to weak LOS in Poland. 
 In contrast to Germany and Poland, the legal opportunity structures in France 
look rather strong and more conducive to legal mobilization. Th e preamble of 
the French Constitution in 1946 stated, “La loi garantit à la femme, dans tous les 
domaines, des droits égaux à ceux de l’homme.” In 1983, labour law prohibited 
discrimination on the grounds of sex. Th e provisions have been constantly broad-
ened and strengthened since then. Th e French law especially envisages the adoption 
of “plans pour l’égalité professionnelle” on the enterprise level between trade unions 
and management (Articles L-1143-1 to -3). Furthermore, it provides for an annual 
comparative gender equality report to the company’s work council on the working 
situation for men and women (Articles L-2323-57 to -59).  35  
 Discrimination is also forbidden in the Penal Code, albeit with diff ering defi -
nitions and sanctions. Claimants oft en choose a criminal procedure, although no 
reduced burden of proof applies.  36  Aft er electoral parity, professional parity was 
introduced with a constitutional amendment in 2008. Article 1 now reads, “La loi 
favorise l’égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux mandats électoraux et fonctions 
électives, ainsi qu’aux responsabilités professionnelles et sociales” (“Th e law pro-
motes equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and elective functions, 
as well as professional and social responsibilities”). 
 32  Adam  Bodnar and  Anna  Ś ledzi ń ska ,  Country Report Poland 2011 for the Annual Report 2011 
( Brussels :  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights ,  2012 ) , chapter 5, working version. 
 33  Cf.  Alexandra Gerber , “ Th e letter versus the spirit: Barriers to meaningful implementation of 
gender equality policy in Poland , ”  Women’s Studies International Forum  33 ( 2010 ):  30 – 37 . 
 34  Lukasz  Bojarski , “ Th e Role of the Nongovernmental Sector in Pursuing Reform of the Legal Aid 
System: Th e Case of Poland , ” in  Making Legal Aid a Reality: A Resource Book for Policy Makers 
and Civil Society , ed. Public Interest Law Institute ( Budapest :  Pilnet ,  2009 ),  127 –38. Interviews PL 
16, 64f, and PL 18, 185–92; Interview PL 4, 15. 
 35  Cf.  Katell Berthou , “ New Hopes for French Anti-Discrimination Law , ”  Th e International Journal 
of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations  19 , no.  1 ( 2003 ) ;  Michel  Miné and  Daniel 
 Marchand ,  Le Droit du travail en pratique , Références ( Paris :  Eyrolles ,  2008 ),  343 –45 and chapter 
XVIII ;  Sophie  Latraverse ,  France: Executive summary of the country report on measures to combat 
discrimination ( 2005 ),  1 . 
 36  Berthou, “New Hopes for French Anti-Discrimination Law,” 111, 115. Interviews F3: 34f, 40; F4: 42. 
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 Since 2001, trade unions and NGOs have also been able to take part in legal 
action.  37  As in Germany, state legal aid and trade union legal support is available. 
Labor law cases in the fi rst instance are heard by the Tribunaux de prud’hommes 
(employment tribunals), which are quasi-judicial bodies with representatives 
elected from among employers and employees. It is assumed that the prospect of 
dealing with a tribunal made up of lay representatives generally lowers individuals’ 
inhibitions in taking legal action. 
 As an institution that investigates and negotiates claims of all forms of discrimi-
nation, the HALDE has contributed to strong LOS in France. Th is independent 
High Authority was also increasingly involved in the pursuit of gender equality.  38  
Th e HALDE was established in the context of transposition of several European 
directives.  39  In May 2011, the HALDE was merged with the “défenseur des droits.”  40  
Anybody who felt discriminated against could fi le a complaint, which could be 
supported by trade unions and other associations. Th e HALDE could initiate its 
own investigations. It collected all information concerning the case, and it could 
demand inspection of the documents, interrogation of witnesses, or investigation 
on site. Th e organization supported victims in choosing suitable legal procedures 
and endeavored to mediate. Aft er hearing a case, the HALDE could make rec-
ommendations; however, it could not issue binding decisions. It could, though, 
give a prosecutor information on a case or even request that the government 
change its discriminatory laws and provisions (Loi no. 2004-1486). 
 In summary, the legal opportunity structures in France are strong because legal 
defi nitions relevant to equal pay claims were clearly written into French labor law, 
and existing regulations provided for associational standing. The HALDE was 
a powerful institution for the promotion of equal rights, because it had its own rights 
of investigation, supported victims, and had a reasonably large budget. It has basi-
cally been able to retain these rights, though it remains to be seen how its situation 
and budget will develop within the institution of the Défenseur des droits.  41  
 As in France, the legal opportunity structures in Switzerland are also quite 
strong. Th e principle of equal pay for work of equal value and the state’s duty to 
take action to enforce this principle have been codifi ed in the constitution since 
1981 as the result of a popular initiative.  42  
 37  Miné and Marchand,  Le Droit du travail en pratique , 373f. 
 38  Cf. HALDE—Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité, ed.,  Rapports 
annuels 2005–2010 (Paris, 2006–2010). Complaints skyrocketed from 1,410 in 2005 to 12,467 in 
2010. Ethnic discrimination has been the most important reason for the increase. Gender discrimi-
nation was claimed in 6 percent (2005) to 10 percent (2010) of all cases; cf.  Rapport Annuel (2010):19. 
 39  Bernard  Stasi ,  Vers la haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité : rapport au 
Premier ministre ( Paris : La documentation francaise,  2004 ). 
 40  Th e Défenseur des droits has been the French ombudsman institution since mid 2011. Several 
diff erent independent bodies have been merged into it, such as the Médiateur de la République, le 
Défenseur des enfants, la Commission nationale de déontologie de la sécurité, and the HALDE, 
cf.  www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/ 
 41  Cf. Loi organique no. 2011-333 du 29 mars 2011 relative au Défenseur des droits. 
 42  Article 8,3 of the constitution reads: “Men and women shall have equal rights. Th e law shall ensure 
their equality, both in law and in practice, most particularly in the family, in education, and in the 
workplace. Men and women shall have the right to equal pay for work of equal value.” It is impor-
tant to note that it was thanks to an act of direct democracy that the equal rights amendment was 
introduced. 
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 Following an expert report on equal pay in 1988,  43  the Loi sur l’égalité   44  
(Gender Equality Act (GEA)) was finally adopted in 1995. It reflects the state 
of affairs in the EU in the mid-1990s, since the Swiss government sought to 
adapt national legislation as much as possible to European legislation.  45  Compared 
with other European anti-discrimination laws, the Swiss Equality Act is a simply 
written, uncomplicated law. It clearly prohibits sexual harassment, as well as 
direct and indirect discrimination, yet does not define them (Art. 3, 2 GEA). 
The act reduces the burden of proof on claimants (Art. 6) except for sexual 
harassment and hiring. Organizations can have a “finding of discrimination” 
declared if the case promises to be relevant for a considerable number of jobs 
(Art. 7). This allows for a form of group or class action, yet individuals have to 
sue for back payments. Switzerland has state legal aid, and trade unions can 
provide legal counseling and representation to their members. 
 Contrary to cases in other countries, in cases under the GEA, not only is 
evidence produced by the claimants, but the court is also required to investigate 
the facts on its own (as put forth in Article 243 of the Code of Civil Procedure). 
Th e GEA also set up conciliation procedures before special cantonal commissions 
(Art. 11 and 12). These very diverse procedures have been standardized and 
integrated into the first national Code of Civil Procedure of 2011 (cf. Articles 
197-212). The procedure is free of charge (Art. 113, 2), “informal,” and aims at 
reconciliation between the disputing parties. The commission’s composition 
must be balanced, with both genders as well as employers and employees being 
represented. The commission also has to investigate the facts.  46  
 In 2005, the GEA was thoroughly evaluated. Th e report pointed out its central 
shortcoming, namely the individualist conception of the law that
 la responsabilité de la mise en œuvre concrète de l’égalité est ainsi transférée 
presque exclusivement aux victimes de discrimination. Les auteurs et auteures 
de discrimination ne courent par contre guère de risques : les sanctions ne 
sont pas importantes au point d’avoir un eff et dissuasif. L’Etat en tant que tel 
n’assume guère de responsabilité d’application.  47  
 The report unsuccessfully proposed setting up administrative institutions with 
investigative power.  48  Currently, no political majorities exist to integrate further 
developments in EU anti-discrimination law into Swiss law (namely, the inclusion 
of other grounds of discrimination and the prohibition of discrimination in the 
provision of goods and services). Nevertheless, the LOS in Switzerland are strong, 
 43  Claudia Kaufmann, “Hintergrund und Entstehung des Gesetzes,” in  Kommentar zum 
Gleichstellungsgesetz , 1–29, Schriftenreihe Schweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund SGB (Basel: 
Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2009). 
 44  RS 151.1, Gender Equality Act (GEA). 
 45  For more details, see  Laura  Englaro ,  Das Ausmass des autonomen Nachvollzugs von EG-Recht 
durch die Schweiz im Kontext des Schweizerischen Gleichstellungsgesetzes ( Basel :  Europa-Institut 
der Universität Basel ,  2004 ). 
 46  Cf.  www.leg.ch/procedure/ch . 
 47  Heidi Stutz, Marianne Schär Moser, and Elisabeth Freivogel, “Evaluation portant sur l’effi  cacité de 
la loi sur l’égalité. Rapport de synthèse” (2005): V. 
 48  Gesine Fuchs, “Suisse: Droits des femmes—un chemin libéral vers l’égalité?”  Chronique internationale 
de l’IRES , no. 113 (2008). 
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given the existence of the constitutional equal pay provision, a law that grants 
associational standing and determines specifi c procedures, including the courts’ 
obligation to establish evidence. However, no equality body with investigative 
or controlling power exists. 
 To summarize, there are marked differences regarding the LOS in the four 
countries analyzed despite the fact that the relevant national legal provisions 
are commonly guided or influenced by the respective EU directives (which, in 
Switzerland, are transposed in a voluntary and incomplete manner). Certain pro-
visions, such as the reduced burden of proof, as well as positive anti-discrimination 
measures, such as affirmative action programs , gender quotas for hiring, and 
promotion, are in force in all countries. Whereas the wording of the provisions 
is more detailed and legally complex in France and Germany, Poland transposed 
the EU directives verbatim, and in sharp contrast, the Swiss text is concise and 
lacks precise definitions. In German court proceedings, associational standing 
is defi ned quite narrowly as an organization’s capacity to act as a “legal advisor.” 
Individual legal access seems to be weakest in Poland. 
 Th e design of equality bodies for “promotion, analysis, monitoring and support 
of equal treatment” (Article 20 2006/54/EC) also varies across the four countries. 
Equality bodies can be comprehensive with investigative powers, as in France, 
or have limited functions, such as the provision of counseling and informa-
tion, as in Germany. Prior to 2011, the Polish authorities had failed to establish 
any procedures or introduce any administrative measures at all. In the other 
countries, provisions for legal action were laid down in the various laws: victims in 
France can decide to file their claims in court or at the HALDE/Défenseur des 
droits. Swiss complaints are handled by special conciliation commissions pre-
ceding court action. 
 Th e unique Swiss constitutional provision on equal pay empowers potential 
claimants, and the German and Swiss constitutional obligations for the state to 
actively pursue gender equality add legitimacy to legal action. Considering the 
LOS in the four countries under study, one would expect a higher level of litigation 
in France and Switzerland and fewer cases in Poland and Germany. 
 3.  Legal Mobilization 
 In order to assess levels of litigation on equal pay across the four countries, the 
research used data gathered from national judicial databases searched in 2008. Th e 
information was then correlated to basic demographic data such as population, 
gender pay gap, and employment rate, and factors that account for the marked 
diff erences were identifi ed. In this section, patterns of litigation in the countries 
under study are discussed using relevant court rulings as well as interviews with 
experts and lawyers. 
 Th e number of registered cases in the national databases diff ers greatly, leading 
to an initial question of whether such diff erences really do refl ect accurately the 
diff erent levels of litigation in practice. Databases are designed as an information 
service and tool for lawyers and judges, i.e., they refer to rulings that are impor-
tant, exemplary, or interesting. Larger countries tend to have a greater number of 
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rulings in the databases, but the different size of the databases cannot in itself 
explain the diff erences. Experts estimate that between 5 and 10 percent of all rulings 
enter the German database.  49  A comparison of the commercial Swisslex with two 
databases that record almost every court case according to the Gender Equality 
Act shows that about half of all cases were registered with Swisslex.  50  
 Estimated levels of equal pay litigation do not appear to correspond to the gender 
pay gap, as can be seen in  Table 1 . However, they do seem to refl ect the respective 
female employment rates across the four countries. Based on the information obtained 
from national case law databases, one may cautiously conclude that, relative to the 
population, litigation for equal pay is highest in Switzerland and lowest in Poland, 
whereas France and Germany have intermediate levels. High litigation in Switzerland 
and a low level in Poland would be in line with the LOS presented above, yet the 
possibly medium level in France and Germany is surprising. 
 Features of national litigation 
 Looking at the variety of actual cases, several features can be observed. Bringing 
a case in Germany was not popular and did not result in a substantial mobiliza-
tion, although important successes for equal pay were achieved. Th e cases here 
were mainly supported or initiated by trade unions. Th ey dealt oft en with com-
plicated issues, namely, whether certain benefi ts, such as early-retirement schemes 
or additional payments, constitute indirect discrimination. Th ese cases were not 
well suited for political mobilization, which fl ourishes on unambiguous issues and 
demands. Yet in the late 1980s, a trade union lawyer saw the strategic importance 
of a problem with the company pension scheme of Deutsche Post and Telekom 
and took legal action. Th e case took fi ve women through all stages of appeal. Th ey 
sued for indirect discrimination, because the Deutsche Post had arbitrarily 
excluded part-time workers working less than 50 percent from the company 
pension scheme. Th e Federal Labor Court decided in favor of the women in 1995, 
but the employers succeeded in having a preliminary reference made to the Court 
of Justice of the EU on the question of the retroactive eff ect. Th ey lost their case and 
had to pay entitlements dating back to 1976, which amounted to about 150 million 
euros.  51  Th is case concerned one of the highest sums of back pay in Germany. 
Many interviewees explained the low number of cases as a result of general obsta-
cles to litigation, such as fi nding the right cases and the lack of class action. Many 
 49  Information on criteria that determine which cases enter the judicial databases was not available 
for the other countries, e.g., from the database operators. Because gender pay equity cases are rare, 
some experts estimated that these processes were reported at above-average rates compared, for 
example, to unfair dismissal cases. In France, lawyers refer mainly not to databases but to special-
ized periodicals; my interviewees assumed that nearly every case would be reviewed by the 
respective lawyers as a service to the profession. 
 50  Cf.  www.gleichstellungsgesetz.ch and  www.leg.ch . Th ese websites are designed as empowerment 
tools for employees and reveal that about 50 percent of all cases before the conciliation commis-
sion go to court. 
 51  Deutsche Post AG v Elisabeth Sievers (C-270/97) and Brunhilde Schrage (C-271/97), 10 February 
2000, Rec. 2000, p. I-00929; see also Schiek, 165f. Concerning the back payment: personal com-
munication with Klaus Lörcher, former trade union lawyer, 9 June 2011. Th e sum is considerably 
lower than the 500 million euros circulated in the press. 
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of them quite resolutely demanded the introduction of a proper form of group 
action as an urgent amendment to the anti-discrimination law.  52  
 According to the analysis of legal opportunity structures, one would have 
expected more litigation in France. Th e country does, however, present an example 
of how a judicial ruling may become almost a precedent and then encounter 
problematic interpretations. Th e decision in the  Ponsolle case in late 1996 became 
a crucial ruling on equal pay. Th e court declared, “L’employeur est tenu d’assurer 
l’égalité de rémunération entre tous les salariés de l’un ou l’autre sexe, pour autant 
que les salariés en cause sont placé dans une situation identique.”  53  
 In cases that followed, an unexpected focus was placed on the defi nition of 
“identical situations,” which proved to be highly problematic for later cases. Although 
not considered a binding precedent, the court ruling developed into a persuasive 
authority. Several equal pay cases that followed were dismissed because claimants 
and their better-paid colleagues were found not to be in an “identical situation” 
or did not perform the same duties.  54  Consequently, equal pay for work of equal 
value is rarely justiciable in France today. 
 As one could guess from the LOS in Poland, this country had the lowest level 
of legal mobilization, namely one case of direct pay discrimination registered in 
the database of lex.pl. In this case, the Supreme Court decided that employers 
must treat old and new employees equally. Th e employer is entitled to wage diff eren-
tiation for the amount and quality of work. In the case, a municipality had paid 
newly recruited employees higher wages, justifying this through a good deal of 
additional training. Since these trainings had nothing to do with the tasks per-
formed, the court saw no justifi cation for higher wages.  55  Despite the fact that only 
 52  Interviews D1: 67, 78; D4: 40; D2: 28; D11: 161–165; D12: 85. 
 53  Cass. soc., 29 octobre 1996, n° 92–43.680, Société Delzongle c/ Mme Ponsolle. Th e employer shall 
ensure equal remuneration for all employees of either sex, provided that the employees in ques-
tion are placed in the same situation. 
 54  See for example, Cass. soc., 21–06–2006, n° 05–41.774, caisse régionale d’assurance maladie 
d’Ile-de-France (CRAMIF), F-D and Cass. soc., 26–06-2008, n° 06–46.204, société Sermo 
Montaigu, F-P; cf. Marie-Th érèse Lanquetin, “Égalité de rémunération entre les hommes et les 
femmes pour une meme travail ou pour un travail de valeur égale. Fonctions diff érentes. Absence 
de valeur égale,”  Droit social , no. 11 (2008): 1132; and interview F1 : 40. 
 55  Wyrok SN z 22.2.2007r., I PK 242/06, cf.  www.monitorprawapracy.pl . 
 Table 1 
 Reported court cases for equal pay and context data 
Country 
Population 
2007
Cases in databases 
1996-2007
Total number of rulings 
in database in 2011
Gender pay 
gap 2007
Employment rate 
men/women 2007 
Germany 82.3 million 31 1.16 million rulings 23.0 % 74.7%/64% 
France 61.8 million 16 1.5 million rulings 16.9% 69.1%/59.6% 
Poland 38.1 million 1 470.000 rulings 7.5% 63.6%/50.6% 
Switzerland 7.5 million 49 220.000 rulings 18.7% 85.6%/71.6% 
 Population and employment rates: Eurostat. Judicial databases: juris.de for Germany, lexbase.fr for 
France, lex.pl for Poland and swisslex.ch for Switzerland. 
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one equal pay case is registered in the database, legal mobilization for women’s 
rights is well known in Poland, for example in discrimination cases concerning 
retirement age and forced retirement for women. Th ere has been substantial legal 
mobilization concerning employment rights in supermarkets. Th ese cases have 
been supported by women’s NGOs, grassroots organizations, and the Strategic 
Litigation Programme of the Helsinki Foundation.  56  Th is means, however, that 
equal pay is just one of several issues that could be fought for in the context of 
women’s rights in the workplace. 
 As hypothesized, legal mobilization was at its highest in Switzerland. Most cases 
and most group action under the Gender Equality Act have been about equal pay. 
Group action concerned discrimination in typical female professions in public 
administration, such as nursing, and kindergarten and primary school teaching. 
Oft en as a consequence of court decisions, the pay scale classifi cation had to be sub-
stantially adapted. Th e very fi rst, case in 1987, was initiated by feminist kindergarten 
teachers in Basel on the grounds of the constitutional provision on equal pay for 
work of equal value, now Article 8, 3, and the fi nal decision was handed down in 
1999. An exemplary group action is the case of health workers in Zurich that was 
carefully prepared by trade unions and health worker organizations and was fi led on 
the day the Equality Law came into force, July 1, 1996. Th e workers claimed that 
nurses, their vocational teachers, as well as physical and occupational therapists, had 
been classifi ed in a discriminatory manner in the new pay scale that came into force 
in 1991. Th e nurses compared their profession with that of the higher-classifi ed 
police offi  cers. In 1998, the court ordered for all four cases a job evaluation expertise. 
In 2001, the employees won a partial victory in their case: nurses were upgraded one 
or two pay classes (which amounted to 500 to 1,000 Swiss francs more in monthly 
salary). Th e resulting additional costs amounted to 70 million Swiss francs annually 
and back pay of about 280 million Swiss francs. Th is case was built upon a high 
degree of regional legal mobilization for the improvement of working conditions in 
the health sector in general, including many demonstrations and protests, especially 
in 1999 and 2000.  57  Trade unions supported many other similar group actions in 
public administration. It is striking that diff erent strategies, e.g., protest and litigation, 
dovetailed. Litigation thus seems to be embedded in trade union work. 
 Discussion of fi ndings 
 Are legal opportunity structures useful in understanding and explain different 
levels of legal mobilization? The presented facts suggest that LOS have some 
explanatory power. Where state legal aid is insuffi  cient, as in Poland, fewer cases 
are taken to court, and/or this only occurs with the support of NGOs. Associational 
standing, as in Switzerland, makes it feasible and reasonable to attack structural 
discrimination in pay schemes via group action. Th e Swiss evaluation also suggests 
 56  For retirement, see for example SN 19.11.08, I PZP 4/08. 
 57  See  www.gleichstellungsgesetz.ch/html_de/103N1007.html . Final verdicts VK.1996.00011, 
VK.1996.00013, VK.1996.00015, and VK.1996.00017, 22 January 2001, Entscheiddatenbank des 
Verwaltungsgerichts Zürich. For the first case, see  http://www.gleichstellungsgesetz.ch/html_
de/103N1191.html . Final verdict of Federal Tribunal: ATF 125 I 14, 8 December 1998. 
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a high impact of the proper application of procedural rules on success. Th is points 
to the relevance of expert knowledge in the courts as a part of legal context. Th e 
ever-increasing number of complaints that had been placed at the French HALDE 
demonstrates social awareness of the discrimination issue. At the same time, the 
neglect of the concept of indirect discrimination in France lowers the prospect 
of success. It points to the importance of notions of discrimination and equality 
in society and its representation in rulings and prevailing opinion. If the factors 
of the legal context and the specifi cs of particular areas of law, like labor law, are 
added to the LOS, the diff erent levels of legal mobilization become more compre-
hensible. So any understanding of the LOS must take into account three additional 
factors: (1) the state’s commitment to, and interpretation of, the rule of law, dura-
tion of legal proceedings, and situation as regards law enforcement; (2) the degree 
of expert knowledge by lawyers and courts, and whether this leads to a smooth 
application of the law; and (3) the specifi c legal issue in question. 
 Firstly, strategic litigation only makes sense if basic elements of the  rule of law 
are in place and if potential claimants and organizations have trust in state institu-
tions and the legal system. Levels of trust in the law in the four countries studied 
here corresponded to the diff erent levels of litigation. According to the European 
Social Survey, people trust state institutions like government, police, and the legal 
system most in Switzerland and least in Poland (consistent ranking Switzerland > 
Germany > France > Poland). On a scale from 1 to 10, trust in the legal system in 
2002 was 6.2 in Switzerland, 5.7 in Germany, 4.8 in France, and only 3.7 in Poland. 
Th ese fi gures have been almost constant, except that in Poland trust in the law 
increased to 4.3 in 2010.  58  When asked about obstacles to legal mobilization, inter-
viewees in Poland especially mentioned the duration of proceedings as a discour-
aging factor. Since “justice delayed is justice denied,” overlong procedures and 
heavy backlogs in the courts inhibit legal mobilization and the adoption of litiga-
tion as a political strategy. French experts also complained about low levels of law 
enforcement  59  in labor law and as a general feature of the judicial system. 
 Th is is the situation on equal pay; it is a political issue not a legal issue. And 
therefore there is something really funny. Every fi ve years there is a new law 
to say the same thing, when the preceeding law has not been enforced. So 
we are in this fi ve-year cycle and it is ridiculous. (Interview F4: 30) 
 Th e inclination to add more details to existing laws in order to close legal gaps 
tends to complicate the legal situation and opens the law to contradictions. From 
this perspective, the boldly written French anti-discrimination provisions actually 
conceal weak legal opportunity structures in action. 
 Secondly, the proper application of important procedural rules in anti-
discrimination law by judges, such as the reduced burden of proof on victims, 
was found to be closely connected to the success of claimants in research con-
ducted during the evaluation of the Swiss Gender Equality Law.   60  This study 
 58  Calculated from European Social Survey (ESS), round 1 (2002) to round 5 (2010). 
 59  Interviews F4: 411f., F3: 70, F9: 17, 38. 
 60  For Switzerland:  Elisabeth  Freivogel , “ Lücken und Tücken in der Anwendung des Gleich-
stellungsgesetzes , ”  Aktuelle Juristische Praxis , no.  11 ( 2006 ): 45f. 
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also identifi ed severe shortcomings and gaps in legal reasoning, particularly in 
courts of fi rst instance. A high degree of expert knowledge by the judges would also 
increase trust in their ability to handle a specifi c case with care and knowledge. 
Restricting the application of equal pay provisions to absolutely identical situations 
derives from a very formal understanding of equality in French (legal) culture;  61  the 
concept of indirect discrimination is thus diffi  cult to understand. In some equal pay 
cases, a claim of indirect gender discrimination could have been made, but litigants 
did not pursue this route.  62  Th e fi rst French ruling about indirect gender discrimi-
nation in retirement schemes was issued in 2010.  63  Lawyers complained about the 
lack of awareness of the nature of gender discrimination in French society in general, 
but especially on the part of judges and the media.  64  Th e result is that indirect dis-
crimination is rarely acknowledged by judges in France. 
 Th irdly, issue specifi c law—in this case, labor law—shapes opportunities for 
legal mobilization in a given area. Th e issue-specifi c law of a country may defi ne 
possible pathways to achieve a particular political goal or compensation for indi-
viduals other than through litigation. Th us the issue-specifi c law needs to be taken 
into account in determining the LOS. Relevant provisions include the protection 
against unfair dismissal or provisions on industrial relations and collective bar-
gaining. One such example is the Swiss protection against wrongful dismissal, which 
is weak.  65  Th ere is no right to continued employment; instead, compensation pay-
ments are limited to six monthly salaries (Code of obligations, Art. 336a). The 
GEA reserves claims for damages for financial loss and suffering (Art. 5, 5). If 
there is nothing to lose, filing a claim might be more likely here than in the 
other countries, where the protection is quite high and lawyers might be able to 
demand return of an applicant to work or a high compensation payment. 
 As far as industrial relations are concerned, trade unions have the strongest 
position, legally and practically, in Germany. Collective negotiations and agree-
ments and the right to form trade unions are constitutionally protected under 
Article 9, 3 of the Basic Law. Collective agreements apply directly and are 
obligatory between the contracting parties (§4, 1 Tarifvertragsgesetz). Th ey are 
widespread, comprehensive, and rather specific on pay classification. As part 
of the “tariff autonomy,” which includes the right to free collective bargaining, 
this position is highly valued, and unionists are very reluctant to attack a dis-
criminatory agreement in court.  66  Strong trade unions can pursue alternative 
strategies to litigation to achieve their goals. Since the mid-1990s, German public 
employees’ trade unions have tried to renegotiate and to “mainstream” gender 
considerations into collective agreements that respect the principle of equal 
 61  Cf. Berthou, 10,  Chloe J.  Wallace , “ European integration and legal culture: indirect sex discrimi-
nation in the French legal system , ”  Legal Studies , vol.  13 , no.  3 ( 1999 ),  397 – 414 . 
 62  Cf. Cour de Cassation, chambre sociale, 21. June 2006, no. 05–41.774, Caisse régionale d’assurance 
maladie d’Ile-de-France CRAMIF and similar cases decided in 2006. 
 63  Cour d’appel de Paris—Pôle 5, Chambre 5, arrêt du 11 juin 2010, no. 145 (Organisme de Retraite 
et de Prévoyance des Employés des Sociétés de Course c/ Burgund); see also Interview F2, 18a. 
 64  Interviews F5, 17f, 23-43; F1, 6f, 17f., 25-33. 
 65  Cf. survey09.ituc-csi.org/survey.php?IDContinent=4&IDCountry=CHE&Lang=EN, visited 10 
December 2011. 
 66  Cf. interviews D1: 36-41; D2: 14; D9: 117-125. 
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cls.2013.21
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 14:42:01, subject to the Cambridge Core
 206   Gesine Fuchs
pay for work of equal value.  67  Th is is an intriguing approach, but both unions and 
employers’ associations seem to be systematically overburdened with the task of 
implementing equal pay. Employers want to keep labor costs down and unions also 
represent the interest of workers in male-dominated jobs, which may be threatened 
by relative pay cuts due to the re-valuation of feminized jobs. 
 Collective bargaining is also part of Swiss industrial relations, yet collective agree-
ments are not very specifi c on pay classifi cation schemes. Change by litigation and 
with the help of job evaluation questionnaires seems to be a more promising avenue. 
Union pluralism in Poland is high and unionization is low, especially in the private 
and the service economy.  68  Collective agreements are rare, as many employers are 
not members of their respective associations. So, little is to be expected from nego-
tiations, all the more so since gender equality is not high on the unions’ agenda.  69  
France also has high union pluralism, with fi ve representative federations, yet lower 
unionization than Germany. Mandatory negotiations on gender equality in business 
make outcomes more contingent on individual personalities and an awareness of 
gender equality issues than in more centralized systems. Th us, the integration of 
issue-specifi c law would let us better understand the legal context that infl uences the 
ability and willingness of social actors to take legal action as opposed to adopting an 
alternative political strategy in pursuit of equal pay in the diff erent countries. 
 Diff erences in areas of substantive law and in industrial relations can also help 
to explain why unions use diff erent strategies for workers’ rights in the diff erent 
countries. One could also hypothesize that the salience of equal pay diff ers in the 
various states and that gender equality in the workplace may be negotiated along-
side other aspects of workers’ rights. 
 Conclusion 
 While every component of LOS influences legal mobilization, legal factors and 
legal context alone are not sufficient to explain the observed variations. Rather, 
they are an important general framework, where other social and political context 
factors develop significance. Most importantly, the components of LOS do not 
explain how norms and values about gender roles, equality and equal pay, as well 
as litigation develop in a given society, and how they influence the probability 
to go to court. In this fi eld of norms and values, two issues seem to be especially 
relevant and emerge as a rewarding field of analysis—namely, the role of media 
coverage and organizational action frames. 
 Mass media is the major, generally accepted site of political contest. It does not 
only indicate broader cultural changes, but also infl uences them.  70  Politicians take 
 67  Cf.  Fuchs , “ Promising paths ”;  Regine  Winter , ed.,  Frauen verdienen mehr. Zur Neubewertung von 
Frauenarbeit im Tarifsystem . ( Berlin :  edition sigma ,  1994 ) ;  Andrea-Hilla  Carl and  Anna  Krehnke , 
“ Aufwertung frauendominierter Tätigkeiten im öff entlichen Dienst , ”  Streit , no. 2 ( 2002 ):  66 – 73 . 
 68  Cf.  David Ost , “ Trade Union Revitalisation in Poland: Trends and Prospects , ” in  Trade union 
revitalisation. Trends and prospects in 34 countries , ed.  Craig  Phelan ( Oxford :  Lang ,  2007 ),  303 –17 ; 
CBOS-Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, “Zwi ą zki zawodowe i naruszenia praw pracownic-
zych” (Trade Unions and the Violations of workers’ rights) (Warsaw, 2010). 
 69  Cf. interviews PL5 and PL3. 
 70  Myra  Ferree Marx  et al .,  Shaping Abortion Discourse. Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany 
and the United States ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press ,  2002 ),  10 . 
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into account the possible eff ects of “published opinion” on public opinion when 
making political decisions.  71  Since in modern democracies people experience 
politics almost exclusively via the media, a non-published event is a non-event. 
Therefore, it is crucial for political actors to catch media attention when seek-
ing support for their issues. Mass media coverage will essentially contribute to 
problem diagnosis and prognosis of equal pay. It will thus influence the expec-
tations of organizations and possible claimants as to whether legal mobilization is 
worthwhile, and whether the public perceives the strategy of litigation as a legiti-
mate and eff ective form of action.  72  An analysis of two high-quality newspapers 
per country,  73  which was conducted in the context of the present study, revealed 
that the chances to advertise legal mobilization through mass media seem limited, 
as it is very difficult for social movement actors to get their arguments heard 
or their cases published. 
 Furthermore, movement identity and collective action frames are crucial 
as to whether organizations employ a litigation strategy or not, as Lisa Vanhala 
convincingly argues.  74  Movement identity and suitable action frames make legal 
mobilization more likely, and it is possible that they can even overcome weak 
legal opportunity structures. Interview data suggest that this is also true for the issue 
of equal pay litigation: Only if equal pay emerges as an important issue in trade 
unions, political action, and campaigns does litigation become feasible. It would 
thus be important to have a closer look at agenda-setting processes for gender 
equality within trade unions, in order to closely investigate organizational pro-
cesses of what has been memorably defined as “naming-blaming-claiming,”  75  
including the signifi cance of networks, core groups of claimants or lawyers, and 
the role of gender stereotypes and concepts of gender discrimination. Finally, 
one should examine how a litigation strategy dovetails with other strategies, like 
legal literacy, collective bargaining, or awareness raising.  76  Th e organizational per-
spective seems essential in explaining legal mobilization. 
 Compared to common law countries, civil law systems seem to give more 
opportunities for agenda setting of a political problem via legislative procedures 
than via court cases. However, it has been shown in this research that activist lawyers 
have successfully attacked insuffi  cient anti-discrimination provisions in written 
law, as with the issue of compensation in Germany. In countries with a strong 
 71  Friedhelm  Neidhardt , “ Öff entlichkeit, öff entliche Meinung, soziale Bewegungen: Einleitung , ” 
in  Öff entlichkeit, öff entliche Meinung, soziale Bewegungen , ed.  Neidhardt  Friedhelm ( Opladen : 
 Westdeutscher Verlag ,  1994 ), 7–41,  25 – 27 . 
 72  For media reporting on civil litigation, see  Jennifer K.  Robbennolt and  Christina A.  Studebaker , 
“ News media reporting on civil litigation and its infl uence on civil justice decision making , ”  Law 
and Human Behavior  27 , no. 1 ( 2003 ) ; for equal pay see McCann,  Rights at work, 58–68. 
 73  For more details and results, see Gesine Fuchs, “Discursive Opportunity Structures and Legal 
Mobilization for Gender Equality in Four Countries 1996-2006,” ssrn.com/abstract=1954028, 
17–30. 
 74  Cf.  Lisa Vanhala , “ Anti-discrimination policy actors and their use of litigation strategies: the infl u-
ence of identity politics , ”  Journal of European Public Policy  16 , no. 5 ( 2009 ):  742 –44. 
 75  Erhard  Blankenburg ,  Mobilisierung des Rechts: eine Einführung in die Rechtssoziologie ( Berlin, 
usw .:  Springer ,  1995 ), 29ff . ;  William  Felstiner ,  Richard  Abel , and  Austin  Sarat , “ Th e Emergence 
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming , ”  Law & Society Review  15 ( 1981 ). 
 76  For Switzerland: Fuchs, “Discursive Opportunity Structures,” 31–4. 
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constitutional court, complaints of unconstitutionality (Verfassungsklage) and void-
ance petitions (Normenkontrollklage) are used to preclude the enforcement of laws 
even once they have been adopted.  77  Th is suggests that the signifi cance of strategic 
litigation in civil law systems as additional channels of political infl uence might have 
been underestimated to date, by researchers and social movements alike. 
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 77  For Germany:  Uwe  Wesel ,  Der Gang nach Karlsruhe: Das Bundesverfassungsgericht in der 
Geschichte der Bundesrepublik ( München :  Karl Blessing Verlag ,  2004 ). 
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